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Rhode Island’s School Funding
Challenges in Historical Context
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley*
INTRODUCTION

A new federal lawsuit, A.C. v. Raimondo, alleges that Rhode
Islanders have a constitutional right to a basic level of education. 1
While the specific claim in that lawsuit is novel, its approach is not.
Beginning in the 1970s, education advocates filed numerous federal
lawsuits alleging that state funding mechanisms for local school
districts violated students’ constitutional rights to education and
equal protection.2 When the United States Supreme Court rejected
these arguments in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, advocates presented their arguments
to state courts, alleging similar violations based on state
constitutional provisions. 3 Rhode Island’s funding system was
challenged in the 1995 case of City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun. 4 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court decisively rejected the challenge, as
well as a successor case filed almost two decades later.5 State
* Assistant Counsel, New York State Education Department; LL.M,
Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law.
Thank you to the library staff at the New York State Library for their research
assistance. Thanks also to Stephen Lapatin and the editorial staff of the Roger
Williams University Law Review for their careful review and to Kaitlin
Morton-Bentley for her insightful suggestions. The views expressed in this
Article are the author's own.
1. Complaint 2, ¶ 1, A.C. v. Raimondo, No. 1:18-cv-00645 (D. R.I. Nov. 28,
2018),
https://www.tc.columbia.edu/media/news/images/2018/november/
CookvRaimondoFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD8T-DLF3].
2. Id. at 15.
3. See 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
4. 662 A.2d 40, 42 (R.I. 1995).
5. Id. at 62–63; Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 792 (R.I.
2014).
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courts have reached different conclusions as to whether their state
constitutions impose funding or adequacy obligations.
Does the Rhode Island Constitution require equality or some
measure of adequacy in state funding to local school districts? This
question actually presents two questions: does the Rhode Island
Constitution impose such a requirement, and, regardless, should
the Constitution impose such a requirement? In this Article, I
contend that neither of these questions can be answered without
examining Rhode Island’s school funding challenges in historical
context. This Article examines two historical periods that are
crucial to understand whether Rhode Island’s Constitution confers
a right to educational funding. The first is the 1840s, a tumultuous
decade that produced the Rhode Island Constitution.6 The second
period is the 1960s and 1970s, the period when advocates, inspired
by the educational jurisprudence that grew out of Brown v. Board
of Education, invented and sold the constitutional argument for
school funding. 7
I further contend that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reached the correct—or at least the only historically defensible—
conclusion in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun. There is no evidence
that Rhode Island sought to enshrine an equality or adequacy
principle in its Constitution. This argument was the creation of
imaginative, well-intentioned academics in the 1960s and 1970s.
While greater funding for impoverished school districts is a noble
goal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court wisely declined to reach such
a policy into the Rhode Island Constitution based in part on a lack
of historical evidence.
As evidenced by A.C. v. Raimondo, endless permutations of the
constitutional argument for educational adequacy persist. I
contend that these arguments should be subjected to the same
historical scrutiny as the funding challenge in City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun. A close examination of the history of a constitutional
provision ensures the existence of an independent judiciary. To
ignore history invites judicial activism, which is a double-edged
sword: it may favor liberal causes one day and conservative ones
the next. 8
6.
7.
8.

See discussion infra section III.
See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 4 (2009) (“The new model of public law litigation
has become such an established part of the legal landscape that conservatives
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A brief word is necessary regarding the method of
constitutional interpretation employed in this Article. There exists
a vigorous debate as to how to best interpret statutory or
constitutional provisions. Two “isms” dominate the literature from
the 1980s to the present: textualism and originalism. These
theories, appealing in their simplicity, have become saddled with
qualifications. A recent book by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and
Bryan A. Garner promoting textualism identified fifty-seven canons
of statutory interpretation (and thirteen “false rules”), 9 while
originalism, according to one commentator, begat the theory of
“original intentions originalism,” which begat “new” originalism.10
The academy is engaged in a perpetual quest for a theory that will
unlock all constitutional conundrums, past and present.
I decline to fashion any such theory. While there is wisdom in
textualism (words should be the focus of the inquiry), originalism
(the intention and history of a provision matter), and the living
constitution (constitutional meanings can evolve over time), I
proceed on the assumption that the paramount consideration is the
text of a constitutional provision and the historical circumstances
that motivated its enactment. In addition, I explicitly reject the
fundamentalist assumption that there is one “true” interpretation
of such provisions. If lawyers wish to dabble in history, they must
understand that the discipline is one of constant argument and
critique, not preordained certainty. 11
as well as liberals now routinely look to the courts to remedy legislative or
executive actions of which they disapprove.”).
9. ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
10. M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TULANE L. REV. 269,
275–76 (2018).
11. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1783-1789 212, n.37 (2015). I also reject the two-fold
approach suggested by Alexander Bickel in his article, “The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision.” Bickel suggested that one
should first examine “the congressional understanding of the immediate effect
of the enactment on conditions then present,” and second, examine “what if
any thought was given to the long-range effect, under future circumstances, of
provisions necessarily intended for permanence.” Alexander M. Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59
(1955). Bickel was one of Justice Felix Frankfurter’s law clerks when the Court
issued the merits and remedy decisions in Brown v. Board of Education. His
theory, then, is better understood as a defense of Brown rather than an
interpretive method with broad applicability. See also Michael J. Klarman,
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
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Part II of this Article offers a general history of public
education in Rhode Island. Part III discusses Henry Barnard and
Thomas Wilson Dorr, whose actions in the 1840s made an indelible
mark on public education in Rhode Island. Part IV examines the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of
Education, the case that spawned immeasurable litigation
concerning public education.12 Part V is devoted to a discussion of
post-war legal activism, the Warren Court, and public education.
Part VI addresses school funding litigation, first at the federal level
and, after 1973, at the state level. Part VII analyzes the two Rhode
Island school funding challenges, and Part VIII offers a brief
conclusion.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN RHODE ISLAND

Massachusetts was the pioneer in colonial education. The
Massachusetts Bay Colony was settled by Puritans, a Calvinist sect
that fled religious persecution in England.13 Generally, colonial
towns in New England during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, including the Massachusetts Bay Colony, funded local
schools by a tax levied on residents.14 These schools were run by a
teacher or schoolmaster selected by the town. As Protestants, the
Puritans believed in the authority of the written Bible above all
else.15 Education, then, was useful insofar as it would facilitate
reading the Bible. 16
Two colonial Massachusetts laws anticipated future trends in
education.
First, a 1642 law required compulsory school
attendance, punishable by fine. 17
This reflected a social

McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
13. GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., TEACHER NOTES: UNITED STATES HISTORY FOR THE
GEORGIA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE IN SOCIAL STUDIES 44 (May 31, 2017),
https://www.georgiastandards.org/Georgia-Standards/Documents/SocialStudies-United-States-History-Teacher-Notes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5BCGVA4].
14. Id. at 8.
15. See April 14, 1642: Massachusetts Passes First Education Law,
https://www.massmoments.org/moment-details/
MASSMOMENTS.ORG,
massachusetts-passes-first-education-law.html
[https://perma.cc/N3BY9LH4] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Massachusetts Passes First
Education Law].
16. Id.
17. Id.
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commitment to school attendance. 18 Second, a 1647 Massachusetts
law required towns with fifty or more inhabitants to appoint
schoolmasters, and towns with one hundred or more inhabitants to
create grammar schools. 19 The latter law became known as the
“Old Deluder Satan Act” after its memorable preface, which
indicated that it was a “chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to
keep men from the knowledge of the Scriptures . . . .” 20 In New
England, schools remained religiously grounded into the early
nineteenth century. 21
Rhode Island did not follow the Massachusetts model of
education. After banishment from the Massachusetts Bay Colony
for his anti-authoritarian views of religion (particularly his
conception of “soul liberty”), theologian Roger Williams welcomed
fellow religious outcasts to Rhode Island, including Baptists,
Quakers, and Jews. 22 For Williams and others, public education
smacked of religion—specifically, Puritanical religion. 23 This
contributed to antipathy toward a mass system of public education,
which could, religious minorities feared, become a tool to silence
religious dissent. It also reflected the “rampant individualism” of
the colony. Scholar Edith Nye MacMullen posits that “[f]ear of
centralization and a concentration of power were almost
pathological” among Rhode Islanders. 24
18. Id. Whether this actually achieved compliance is beside the point. As
scholar David B. Tyack put it, “generally these laws were unenforced and
probably unenforceable.” David B. Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the
History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 355, 359 (1976).
19. Massachusetts Passes First Education Law, supra note 15.
20. Old Deluder Satan Law of 1647, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/files/
documents/2016/08/ob/deludersatan.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ML-Z3R9] (last
visited Feb. 22, 2019).
21. One aspect of this legacy was that Thomas Wilson Dorr’s People’s
Constitution, discussed herein, explicitly referenced the “fear of God” as a
rationale for a system of public education. CHARLES A. CARROLL, PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN RHODE ISLAND 13 (1918).
22. October 9, 1635: Roger Williams Banished, MASSMOMENTS.ORG,
https://www.massmoments.org/moment-details/roger-williams-banished.html
[https://perma.cc/3JMR-FLYK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Roger
Williams Banished].
23. See Massachusetts Passes First Education Law, supra note 15.
24. EDITH NYE MACMULLEN, IN THE CAUSE OF TRUE EDUCATION: HENRY
BARNARD AND THE 19TH CENTURY SCHOOL REFORM 106 (1991). Charles A. Caroll,
whose 1918 book “Public Education in Rhode Island” was relied upon by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court relied in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, contests
this assertion and resents any implication of “alleged backwardness in
education.” CARROLL, supra note 21, at 13.
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Despite these fears, in the wake of the industrial revolution,
middle-class Rhode Islanders eventually warmed to the idea of
public education. Ample access to waterpower made northern
Rhode Island uniquely situated to become the center of the state’s
industrial revolution. 25 The technology for the water-powered
textile mill had been pioneered in England by Jedediah Strutt. 26
Samuel Slater, one of eight children in an English farming family,
apprenticed with Strutt in the late eighteenth century.27 Slater
realized the potential of the textile mill and memorized as much of
the design as he could.28 After Slater’s apprenticeship expired in
1789, he immigrated to New York to replicate the experiments in
America.29 While in New York, he learned that Moses Brown, a
Rhode Island businessman, sought to introduce cotton spinning and
textile production to Rhode Island.30 Brown and Slater agreed to a
deal, and, after futile efforts to impose Arkwright-style spinning
frames on existing machinery, Slater recreated Strutt’s designs
from England. 31 Slater was immensely successful; the first mill
was built on the banks of the Blackstone River in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, in 1793. 32 But recreating Strutt’s designs was illegal; for
his misdeeds, Slater was dubbed, “Slater the traitor” across the
Pond.33 President Andrew Jackson, by contrast, called Slater “The
Father of the American Industrial Revolution.” 34 Mills proliferated
in the Blackstone River Valley, in close proximity to Providence.35
As industrial technology advanced, proximity to water was no
longer necessary and Providence transformed into a manufacturing
center.36
25. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 106.
26. Strutt had based his design, in turn, on architecture by the British
inventor Richard Arkwright. JOHN WILLIAMS HALEY, THE LOWER BLACKSTONE
RIVER VALLEY 50 (1936).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 50–51.
31. Id. at 51.
32. Id. at 52.
33. Samuel Slater - The Father of the American Industrial Revolution,
DAILY KOS (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:29 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/
2013/3/29/1197996/-Samuel-Slater [https://perma.cc/VCS9-95W4].
34. Id.
35. ERIK J. CHAPUT, THE PEOPLE’S MARTYR: THOMAS WILSON DORR AND HIS
1842 RHODE ISLAND REBELLION 15 (2013).
36. Id.
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The textile mills ushered in the rise of the modern industrial
state, with all its benefits and burdens. The impact of industrialism
on Rhode Island cannot be overstated. It shifted the state’s historic
center of power from the sea to the land, which shifted political and
economic power from Newport to Providence. 37 It also led to an
influx of immigrants, who arrived to meet factory owners’ demand
for cheap labor.38 These immigrants recalibrated the social
dynamic of Providence: “The influx of thousands of strangers into
what had been a relatively homogeneous community disrupted
traditional face-to-face relationships and eroded consensual
values.” 39
Industrialism also caused political inequality, which was
particularly pronounced in Rhode Island. 40 The state, still
operating under its colonial charter issued in 1620, afforded equal
representation to each village or city in the general assembly,
regardless of population. As Americans and immigrants became
increasingly packed into urban and manufacturing centers, this
produced absurd results. For example, in 1841, Providence housed
forty percent of the white male population (which paid two-thirds
of Rhode Island’s taxes), but only provided five percent of the state’s
lawmakers.41
The industrial revolution coincided with the social movement
known as the Second Great Awakening, a national movement of
religious revival characterized by appeals to emotion and
revelation. 42 The Second Great Awakening also had a social
component; many reformers sought to purify their souls by
purifying society.43 This led reformers to advocate for temperance
and other forms of social and individual improvement. 44 The “goal
was . . . to elevate the moderate, self-reliant, industrious, and moral

37. See id. at 15–16; see also JOHN S. GILKESON, JR., MIDDLE-CLASS
PROVIDENCE, 1820–1940 7 (1986).
38. See generally GILKESON, supra note 37, at 7.
39. Id. at 19.
40. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 106.
41. Id. at 106–07.
42. See Religious Transformation and the Second Great Awakening,
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/us/22c.asp [https://perma.cc/UNJ3WWNS] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
43. Id.
44. Institutionalizing Religious Belief: The Benevolent Empire,
http://www.ushistory.org/us/22d.asp
[https://perma.cc/
USHISTORY.ORG,
M7M4-JWG8] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
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citizen.” 45 This reinforced the Victorian belief that society was
engaged in a perpetual march toward progress. 46
This reforming impulse manifested in a mission to improve
public schools.47 Nye MacMullen explains that, in the early 1800s,
a “new vision and a new urgency” to improve public education
appeared. This vision had two elements.48 First, education was to
be approached methodologically. 49 Methods for instructing pupils
and teachers alike would be ascertained, taught, and replicated. 50
Second, states were called upon to do more to assist local school
districts. 51 Not unlike later social reform movements like the New
Deal and the Great Society, education reform was a top-down affair.
Reformers sought to utilize the power of towns, villages, and
cities—and to some extent, the state—to improve the quality of
local education.52 The most prominent feature of the reform
movement was the concept of the “common school”—so named
because it was common to all inhabitants of a locality. 53 In the
common school movement, the Victorian and Protestant values of
“religious faith, economic industry, civic virtue, and education
[were] all closely linked . . . .” 54
III. THE REFORMERS: HENRY BARNARD AND THOMAS WILSON DORR

The two towering figures in the common school movement were
Horace Mann and Henry Barnard. While Barnard has slid into
relative obscurity, in their day, both Mann and Barnard were giants
who sought to bring structure and rigor to the teaching
45.
46.
47.

NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 50.
Id.
See id. at 53; see also CARL L. BANKSTON III & STEPHEN J. CALDAS,
EDUCATION—AMERICA’S CIVIL RELIGION: A SOCIAL HISTORY 29, 31

PUBLIC
(2009).
48. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 54.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id. Historian John S. Gilkeson, Jr. argues that an incipient middle
class formed around the time of the common school movement, and that the
public education movement was one way in which the “stable, industrious,
sober middle classes of society” set themselves apart from the excesses of the
rich and the uncultured poor. GILKESON, supra note 37, at 10.
53. Public School, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
54. BANKSTON & CALDAS, supra note 47, at 24. The quote describes the
philosophy of lexicographer Noah Webster but could be equally said concerning
the common school movement.
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profession.55 Barnard is important to the history of Rhode Island,
as the State brought him in as an outside expert to make
recommendations regarding Rhode Island’s educational system.
Barnard was raised in a prosperous Hartford, Connecticut,
household, and later attended Yale University. 56 He meandered
for a few years after graduation, and eventually set his sights on
politics. Barnard was elected to the Connecticut Legislature in
1837.57 Although the school improvement movement preceded his
election, Barnard “adopted the school cause” as his own. 58 Barnard
threw himself into the issue, investigating Connecticut’s public
schools and designing a comprehensive system of school reform.59
His investigation culminated in a report, which New York
Chancellor James Kent described as a “‘bold and startling
document.’” 60 It was a meticulously detailed description of the
system that highlighted its weaknesses and identified areas of
potential improvement.61 The Connecticut Legislature enacted
many of Barnard’s proposed reforms, and several years later,
“[a]ttendance at school meetings was higher, there were new and
repaired schools throughout the state, and in many of them uniform
sets of books had been made available . . . .” 62 By 1841, Connecticut
Democrats fought back against public school reform, an issue which
they deemed “a party question, inaugurated by the Whigs, for the
benefit of the Whigs.” 63 In 1842, when Democrats achieved a
majority in both houses, they repealed most of Barnard’s reform
legislation. 64
Nevertheless, Barnard’s reputation as an educational reformer
of the highest order was solidified. In 1843, Rhode Island Governor
James Fenner engaged Barnard to repeat the Connecticut magic;
his specific orders were “to survey the state, to visit schools and
collect information in order to make recommendations for the
‘improvement and better management of same.’” 65
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at ix.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 111.
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Barnard stepped into a state recovering from a political crisis.
The crisis was precipitated by a rebellion led by Thomas Wilson
Dorr, an attorney and social activist.66 Dorr descended from two
generations of traders.67 After making a fortune in Massachusetts,
Dorr’s father settled in Providence.68 Dorr enjoyed a privileged
upbringing, attending Phillips Exeter Academy and Harvard.69
Upon graduation from Harvard, he studied law with New York
Chancellor James Kent, the aforementioned admirer of Barnard’s
Connecticut report and “the most prominent state-level jurist in the
country.” 70 Dorr returned to Providence in the mid-1820s to
practice law after a clerkship with famed Rhode Island attorney
John Whipple.71 After a tour of the South and a sojourn in New
York City, Dorr returned to Providence in 1831. 72 He enjoyed a few
years of success as a practicing lawyer and then threw himself into
politics. 73 Dorr was elected to Rhode Island’s General Assembly in
1834 as a Whig. 74 Dorr later switched party affiliation and became
the Democratic Party chair in 1840. 75
Dorr was an ardent reformer and an abolitionist. He favored
greater banking regulation and, as relevant to this Article, public
education reform. Indeed, one of Dorr’s earliest causes was for the
creation of a high school in Providence. 76 However, the issue that
became his rallying cry was universal white male suffrage. As
mentioned above, Rhode Island continued to operate under its
colonial charter in the nineteenth century.77 The charter set
restrictive voting conditions: only landowners with land worth more
than $134 (in contemporary dollars) could vote. 78 Professor
Lawrence Friedman estimates that this “excluded perhaps nine out
of ten even of white males over twenty-one.” 79 Dorr railed against
this requirement, which he felt to be a mockery of democratic
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 29.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 23, 28.
See id. at 25.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 32.
See id. at 30.
Id.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (3d ed. 2005).
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representation.
Dorr eventually joined the Rhode Island Suffrage Association,
a “conglomeration of urban Whigs, reform-minded Democrats, and
radical labor leaders.” 80 The Suffrage Association developed a
statement of rights called the People’s Constitution, which
contained many of the reforms close to Dorr’s heart, including a
greater role for the State in education. The education clause read
as follows:
The diffusion of knowledge, and the cultivation of a sound
morality in the fear of God being of the first importance in
a republican State, and indispensable to the maintenance
of its liberty, it shall be an imperative duty of the
Legislature to promote the establishment of free schools
and to assist in the support of public education.81
The People’s Constitution also directed revenue from “lotteries
and auction duties, as well as the entire income of the United States
deposit fund” to be placed in a permanent education fund, thus
providing a continual and ample source of state funding for
education.82
One reform cause notably absent from the People’s
Constitution was abolition. While personally opposed to slavery,
Dorr excluded abolition from the coverage of the People’s
Constitution as part of a political bargain. 83 For this, he was
pilloried by anti-slavery activists. 84
The General Assembly, responding to the People’s
Constitution, called a constitutional convention in 1841 and
developed its own constitution, the so-called Landholders’
Constitution.85 The Landholders’ Constitution included, like the
People’s Constitution, a provision concerning education. However,
it was much more general than its counterpart. It read as follows:
The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue, among the
80. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 51. The Rhode Island Suffrage Association
was founded on March 27, 1840. Id.
81. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 46–47 (R.I. 1995) (emphasis
omitted); see also CARROLL, supra note 21, at 121.
82. CARROLL, supra note 21, at 123. The People’s Constitution further
forbade borrowing from the aforementioned fund. Ironically, funds were
borrowed to suppress Dorr’s Rebellion. Id.
83. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 59, 69.
84. Id. at 69–70, 75.
85. Id. at 64–65.
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people being essential to the preservation of their rights
and liberties, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly
to promote public schools and to adopt all other means to
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education which they may deem necessary and proper.86
Dorr participated in the Landholders’ Convention, but soon soured
on it when the convention decided to retain, among other
provisions, the property requirements for voters.87
The Suffrage Association, through the newly-formed People’s
Party, submitted the People’s Constitution to the people for a vote.
The vote passed overwhelmingly: 13,944 in favor and fifty-two
opposed.88 Unsurprisingly, newly “enfranchised” voters (i.e., those
who were not, in fact, eligible to vote but would receive the franchise
if the vote passed), cast ballots in favor of the measure. However,
even excluding these voters, the ballot measure still would have
passed: the majority of legal freeholders voted in favor of the
People’s Constitution.89 On April 18, 1842, elections were held
under the People’s Constitution and Dorr was elected Governor.90
Rhode Island now boasted two governments, and a constitutional
crisis was born.
The Landholders’ Constitution was also put to a vote, but it
failed to pass by a narrow margin of 8,689 to 8,013. 91 While Dorr
celebrated, the general assembly set in motion a plan to crack down
on the Suffrage Association. In early April 1842, it passed a series
of resolutions, one of which deemed it treason to assume office
under the People’s Constitution.92 On May 9, 1842, a warrant was
issued for Dorr’s arrest. 93
The stage was thus set for a dramatic confrontation between
the existing government and the People’s government. Instead, two
events in May 1842 caused the precipitous downfall of Dorr and the
People’s Party. First, despite a personal appeal from Dorr,
86. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 47 (R.I. 1995).
87. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 66.
88. Id. at 76–77.
89. Id. at 77.
90. Patrick T. Conley, Popular Sovereignty or Public Anarchy? America
Debates the Dorr Rebellion, in RHODE ISLAND IN RHETORIC AND REFLECTION:
PUBLIC ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS 129, 130 (2002).
91. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 84–85.
92. Id. at 85.
93. Id. at 119.
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President John Tyler refused to provide assistance to the People’s
Party.94 Tyler feared that federal intervention would have
explosive implications in the American South: if the federal
government were willing to intervene on behalf of disenfranchised
white voters, what would stop a later Yankee administration from
intervening on behalf of African-Americans? 95 Although Tyler
stood to lose support from Northern Democrats who supported
Dorr, the risk of igniting the slavery question was too grave. Tyler
wrote to Rhode Island Governor Samuel Ward King and informed
him that he would not intervene in Rhode Island’s internecine
squabble if and until it reached the point of armed rebellion. 96
Second, on May 17, 1842, Dorr launched a disastrous attempt
to seize an arsenal in Providence. 97 After President Tyler denied
Dorr’s request for federal assistance, Dorr visited New York City.98
There, Dorr received a friendly reception and the promise of
support. 99 When Dorr returned to Rhode Island, he learned that
Governor King had upped the political stakes: King had declared
martial law and imprisoned a number of Dorr’s supporters.100
Additionally, a one thousand dollar bounty had been placed on
Dorr’s head. 101
Dorr faced this adversity with revolutionary fervor. Upon his
return to Providence in May 1842, he delivered a speech in which
he professed, “‘his readiness to die in the cause in which he had
sacrificed everything but his life.’” Raising a sword skyward, Dorr
declared that his “‘ensanguined blade should be again imbued with
blood, should the people’s cause require it.’” 102
Dorr decided that it was time to take action and seize the
arsenal located in Providence. Dorr secured two cannons in a
building controlled by local militias and arranged for them to be
wheeled to his headquarters on Federal Hill.103 In the evening,
94. See id. at 132.
95. See id. at 88–91.
96. Id. at 90–91.
97. Id. at 136.
98. Id. at 144.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 155–56.
101. Id. at 144.
102. Howard R. Ernst, A Call to Arms: Thomas Wilson Dorr’s Forceful Effort
to Implement the People’s Constitution, in 66 RHODE ISLAND HISTORY 59, 62
(2008).
103. Id. at 62, 63.
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Dorr and hundreds of his supporters (though less than anticipated),
proceeded to the arsenal to launch an attack. 104 The cannons,
which were the centerpiece of the planned assault, did not fire. 105
Dorr affected a hasty retreat. This, in turn, caused his outside
support, including in New York, to evaporate. The “Dorr Rebellion”
thereafter collapsed and the general assembly regained control of
the State. 106 Dorr was eventually captured, tried for treason, found
guilty, and received a life sentence of hard labor.107 His sentence
was later commuted, but Dorr lived out the rest of his days in
relative obscurity. 108
After the failure of the Landholders’ Convention, the general
assembly drew up a new constitution, which voters approved in
November of 1842. 109 The Constitution boasted some significant
reforms; for example, it offered suffrage to African-Americans and
outlawed slavery.110
But despite these concessions to
egalitarianism, the document generally affirmed the interests of
Rhode Island’s elites. 111 For example, while it lessened voting
restrictions, it retained the $134 property qualification for “foreignborn naturalized citizens,” which, according to Dorr’s biographer,
Erik J. Chaput, was intended to disenfranchise Irish Catholics who
were immigrating in large numbers. 112 And its education provision
was remarkably similar to the version set forth in the Landholders’
Convention. 113 Thus, the conservative forces had won. Governor
104. Id. at 63.
105. Id. at 73.
106. Id. at 74, 75.
107. Id. at 76.
108. Id. The Dorr Rebellion gave rise to the well-known Supreme Court
case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). Luther was a Dorr ally who
challenged a raid on his house and asked the Court to decide which
government—the People’s or the Charter—was in place during the tumultuous
events of 1842. Id. at 3. The Court dodged the question, deeming it a political
issue, and not a legal dispute. Id. at 35. For an explanation of the case, which
is beyond the scope of this Article, see CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 192–203.
109. See CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 166.
110. See id. at 165, 167–168.
111. See id. at 167.
112. Id. Specifically, the Constitution created three classes of voters: (1)
“native-born citizens with a year’s residency [who] owned real estate valued at
$134, or had two years’ residency and paid taxes on real or personal property
valued at $134 or more”; (2) voters who “lived in the state for two years and
paid a $1 registry tax”; and (3) “foreign-born naturalized citizens who qualified
to vote or hold office only by owning $134 worth of real estate.” Id.
113. See id. at 166.
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King’s successor in 1843 was James Fenner, who previously served
as Governor from 1807 to 1811, and again from 1824 to 1831. 114
Governor Fenner’s party, which had been assembled by Governor
King in response to the Dorr Rebellion, called itself the Law and
Order or “legal” party of Rhode Island.115 Thus, in a not-too-subtle
metaphor, law and order had been restored to Rhode Island.
In the wake of the tumultuous and divisive events of the Dorr
Rebellion, Rhode Island politicians agreed on a noncontroversial
cause: incremental improvement of the public schools. Barnard
was an attractive candidate for the task, as his Great Awakeninginfluenced vision of public school improvement was agreeable to
both moderate Whigs and moderate Democrats. 116 Barnard
brought the same tireless, methodical approach that he employed
in Connecticut to Rhode Island. 117
Barnard produced an educational proposal containing various
provisions concerning support of the public schools.118 The plan
established a firm administrative structure for the public schools
and “mandated a shared responsibility for the support of schools”
between local districts and the State.119 With respect to funding,
while the plan confirmed that twenty-five thousand dollars of state
money would be devoted to the “‘encouragement and maintenance
of public schools,’” it did not require local districts to establish
schools or set a financial floor.120 The general assembly adopted
Barnard’s plan and appointed him the first Commissioner of
Education for the State of Rhode Island. 121
Barnard’s education plan promoted organization and quality in
the public education system, but did not require the State to
allocate significant funds to education. 122 Thus, there is no
evidence that the drafters of the Rhode Island Constitution,
particularly in light the tumultuous events of the 1840s, sought to
114. Fenner, James, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=f000074
[https://perma.cc/AK5H-MYMH] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
115. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 79.
116. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 116.
117. Id. at 113. The first, held in Bristol on December 16, 1843, was “widely
reported in the press.” Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 119.
120. Id. at 117.
121. Barnard’s plan called for the creation of the Commissioner position.
Id. at 120–21.
122. Id. at 146.
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equalize educational resources throughout the state vis-à-vis the
Rhode Island Constitution.
IV. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

The argument that state and federal constitutions require
equal or adequate funding originated in the post-World War II era,
an era conveniently bookended by two landmark United States
Supreme Court cases concerning public education: Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown I), in 1954,123 and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, in 1973. 124 Law had previously been
utilized as a political and social tool, but its use in these respects
grew exponentially in the post-war era. In the hands of activists,
law became a blunt instrument to compel the government to
effectuate social change. The intellectual roots of this development
can be traced to Brown. 125
While in retrospect, Brown seems a fait accompli, it was a
groundbreaking and radical decision that departed from traditional
notions of judicial review. 126 Noah Feldman put the stakes thusly:
“A Supreme Court ruling that segregation was unconstitutional
would be the most aggressive piece of judicial activism in American
history.” 127 After oral arguments in Brown I, the Justices were
immediately divided, and those who sought to strike down
segregation disagreed on how to do so. 128 Justice Robert H.
Jackson, reluctant to strike down segregation, insisted that if the
Court prohibited segregation, it should admit that it was making
new law and not adhering to the original meaning of the equal
protection clause. After heroic efforts of persuasion led by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, the Court reached a consensus: it would hold
that segregation was unconstitutional without Justice Jackson’s

123. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
124. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
125. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.
126. See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 373 (2010). As Feldman explains, “The
[federal] judiciary had no legacy of protecting racial or other minorities. At no
time in the history of the United States had a judicial body stood in the
vanguard of promoting progressive social change. For that matter, no judges
in the world had ever done such a thing.” Id.
127. Id. at 383.
128. See id. at 374–78; see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–50 (2008).
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candid admission.129 When Justice Warren read the opinion aloud
and reached the key holding, he improvised the word
“unanimously,” so as to read: “we unanimously hold.” 130 At the
word “unanimously,” audible gasps went through the courtroom. 131
It was a bold, courageous stand against segregation. But
rendering the decision was the easy part. Brown I addressed
liability (i.e., whether segregated schools violated the equal
protection clause), while a successor decision, known as Brown II,
addressed the remedy (i.e., how segregation would be
eliminated). 132 The Court understood that a demand for immediate
compliance might lead Southern states to simply abolish public
education.133
Brown II was issued on May 31, 1955, one year after
Brown I sent shockwaves through the political and judicial
system.134 It returned the underlying cases to the lower courts and
informed them that principles of equity should guide the remedy:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will
be guided by equitable principles . . . characterized by a
practical flexibility . . . Courts of equity may properly take
into account the public interest in the elimination of such
obstacles . . . . 135
In other words, courts were commanded to do what they had to do
to implement Brown I. 136 With respect to timing, however, the
Court gave school districts and states substantial leeway. 137 The
Court recognized the myriad difficulties in restructuring local
school systems and acknowledged that change could not occur
overnight.138 Thus, the Court ordered compliance to proceed with
“all deliberate speed.” 139
Despite the Justices’ “heroic” compromise and ruling, Brown I
129. Id. at 402.
130. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
133. Lino A. Graglia, When Honesty Is “Simply . . . Impractical’ for the
Supreme Court: How the Constitution Came to Require Busing for School
Racial Balance, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1987).
134. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 294.
135. Id. at 300.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 300–01.
139. Id. at 301.
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proved “incoherent as a statement of constitutional law.” 140 Noah
Feldman explained:
The mess that the Court and the country made of Brown
[I] in the years that followed reflected this incoherence.
Was Brown a strong statement that the Constitution
demanded desegregation? Then why did its sequel, Brown
II, contemplate a gradual and stepwise remedy, one that
was not even specified in detail? Was Brown [I] based on
the original meaning of the Constitution or on changed
circumstances that required the Constitution itself to
change? 141
The Court’s “intentional” decision to gloss over these issues,
Feldman argues, “cast the whole problem of constitutional
interpretation into decades of turmoil.”142
Conceptual problems aside, implementation of Brown II was a
herculean labor. In response to the Brown decisions, “[g]ood faith
did not follow” in the deep South. 143 Some localities actively
resisted, while others dragged their heels. Racial violence surged
in 1955; this violence included the infamous and “particularly
gruesome” murder of Emmett Till. 144 In March of the following
year, nineteen United States Senators and eighty-two United
States Representatives signed the so-called “Southern Manifesto,”
a document that denounced Brown II as an “abus[e] [of] judicial
power” and “urged southerners” to resist forced integration by “all
‘lawful means.’” 145 In 1959, Prince Edward County, Virginia closed
all of its public schools. African-Americans challenged the closure
in court, but students lost years of schooling while this litigation
played out. 146 Some whites, desperate to find a fig leaf for
140. FELDMAN, supra note 126, at 407.
141. Id. (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 407–08.
143. Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation
and the Finding of Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 524 (1987).
144. The Civil Rights Movement and the Second Reconstruction, 1945–1968,
ART
&
ARCHIVES,
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
HIST.,
REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-andPublications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Civil-RightsMovement/ [https://perma.cc/EK5H-MNMR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
145. Id.; see also JAMES T. PATTERSON, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED
STATES 1945–1974 398 (1996).
146. Patterson, supra note 145, at 398; BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR
SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1951–1964 241 (1965).
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segregation, even dredged up the antiquated doctrine of
interposition.147 School districts were repeatedly dragged into
court, and several of the disputes reached the United States
Supreme Court.148
The Court affirmed its holdings in Brown I and Brown II and
grew increasingly tired of efforts to evade its desegregation orders.
In the 1968 case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County, the Court struck down a school board’s “freedom of choice”
plan enacted 10 years after Brown II.149 The Court chided the
school board for the delay, calling it out its “deliberate perpetuation
of [an] unconstitutional dual system” and declaring that “[s]uch
delays are no longer tolerable.” 150 Additionally, in the 1971 case of
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court
opined that the States were moving too slow, integration was
inevitable, and, though it would be painful and awkward, the
transitional period of integration would be brief. 151 The Court also
explicitly endorsed a polarizing remedy: busing. Thus, the Court
gave its blessing to judicial rerouting of local busing assignments to
promote racial diversity. 152
The majority of white Americans disapproved of busing,153 and
the public response to such efforts was “swift and largely
hostile.” 154 As commentators Thomas and Mary Edsall memorably
put it, busing “fell like an ax through the Democratic Party,
severing long-standing connections and creating a new set of
troubled alliances: white, blue-collar northerners with southerners
against blacks and upper-middle-class liberals.” 155 Richard Nixon,
147. CARL T. BOGUS, BUCKLEY: WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR. AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 168 (2010).
148. Graglia, supra note 133, at 1156. Professor Lino A. Graglia, stalwart
enemy of the Court’s desegregation cases, argues that it was the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, not Brown I, that spurred the Court’s broad endorsement of
remedies. Id.
149. 391 U.S. 430, 438–39 (1968).
150. Id.
151. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). “The remedy for such segregation may be
administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations
and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience
cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being
made to eliminate the dual school systems.” Id.
152. See generally Chandler, supra note 143.
153. ANDREW HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE
CULTURE WARS 63 (2015); PATTERSON, supra note 145, at 732 (1996).
154. See Chandler, supra note 143, at 527.
155. See HARTMAN, supra note 153.
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in particular, made much political hay out of public opposition to
busing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was a deliberate
strategy to cultivate the white southern vote and secure his
reelection in 1972.156
While the Court had suggested in Green and Swann that its
commitment to integration was unbending, its enthusiasm waned
in the 1970s. Just three years after the Court’s enthusiastic
commitment to desegregation in Swann, it held, in Milliken v.
Bradley, 157 that Detroit could not combat white flight by merging
suburban, largely white school districts with overwhelmingly
The Court reasoned that the
African-American Detroit. 158
suburban districts had not engaged in segregation and, thus, could
not be forced to take any remedial action. Milliken, Professor
James T. Patterson argues, “badly hurt whatever hopes reformers
still maintained of overturning de facto segregation of the schools .
. . .” 159
V. THE LEGAL HOOK, THE WARREN COURT, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

For all the trouble surrounding its implementation, Brown I
was a massive victory for social activists. Brown I proved that
lawyers could dream up a theory and enact it into law. Better yet,
lawyers could share in the moral credit for their achievements. 160
This proved irresistible for lawyers in the post-war era, who,
emulating the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s Legal Defense
Fund, created legal organizations devoted to social causes.161
These self-professed public interest lawyers, in the name of the
weak and disenfranchised, attacked governmental programs for
failing to live up to federal law or constitutional standards.162 And
they did so, as Professors Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod

156. PATTERSON, supra note 145, at 730.
157. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
158. PATTERSON, supra note 145, at 734.
159. Id.
160. ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 17–18 (2003). “Heroes in Congress
proclaimed new rights, hero-judges enforced the new rights against the lawbreaking state and local officials, and hero-attorneys guarded the new rights.”
Id. at 28.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id.
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explain, by way of the legal hook. 163 The legal hook operated as
follows:
Reform-minded attorneys identify a program that needs
change, construct a legal theory that some constitutional
or statutory requirement has been violated, and file a
lawsuit. The alleged violation becomes, in the parlance of
lawyers, a ‘legal hook’ for seeking broader reform.164
The legal hook was successful in achieving victories in court. Public
interest attorneys scored a host of victories during the 1960s and
1970s by using law to achieve social reforms.165
The legal hook gibed with the liberal, reform-minded spirit that
animated the Supreme Court in the 1960s. While departing from
the text and history of the Constitution proved wrenching to the
Brown I Court, the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren found it
far easier. Depending on one’s political or jurisprudential views,
the Warren Court’s decisions are the most beloved or maligned
holdings of all time. Some notable examples include Gideon v.
Wainwright, which established a right to counsel in state criminal
proceedings, Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court articulated a list
of rights police officers must recite prior to custodial interrogation,
and Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court discerned a
constitutional right to “marital privacy,” which encompassed
contraceptive communications.166
Griswold was the most
infamous. In flowery language, Justice William Douglas opined
“that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance.” 167
Griswold’s reasoning, in turn, was
163. Id. at 1.
164. Id. at 3–4.
165. See generally id. at 3–6.
166. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Justice Stewart phrased it best:
“What provision of the Constitution, then, does make this state law
invalid? The Court says it is the right of privacy ‘created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees.’ With all deference, I can find
no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part
of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (majority opinion). Warren’s biographer Jim
Newton relates a humorous anecdote: when the Court broke for summer
vacation after Griswold was decided, Warren penned a note to Justice Douglas
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instrumental to Roe v. Wade, the most controversial product of the
Warren Court’s jurisprudential philosophy. 168
The activist spirit was not limited to high-profile disputes. For
example, in a 1973 case, the Court held that a group of five law
students could challenge orders of a federal agency based on the
group’s allegation that claimed that they “suffered economic,
recreational and aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse
environmental impact” of a regulatory action.169 Holdings like
these reflected the belief of many of the Justices that the law should
adapt with the times, unrestrained by precedent or historical
understanding of constitutional provisions. Chief Justice Warren
captured this sentiment in his 1972 book, “A Republic, If You Can
Keep It”:
Where there is injustice, we should correct it; where there
is poverty, we should eliminate it; where there is
corruption, we should stamp it out; where there is violence,
we should punish it; where there is neglect, we should
provide care; where there is war, we should restore peace;
and wherever corrections are achieved we should add them
permanently to our storehouse of treasures.170
Brown was but one attack upon racial disparity in public
education—an arguably more significant development was the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which, like Brown, prohibited segregation in
public schools.171 The Civil Rights Act also contained a procedural
provision that had a significant impact on public education. 172 This
provision required the United States Commissioner of Education—
which implored him to “[k]eep our Penumbra flying all summer!” JIM NEWTON,
JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 455 (2006).
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified, Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
169. U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 678 (1973).
170. NEWTON, supra note 167, at 516–17. The quote is inscribed on the
tombstone where Warren and his wife Nina are buried in Arlington National
Cemetery. Id.
171. Graglia, supra note 133, at 1156.
172. Elizabeth Evitts Dickinson, Coleman Report Set the Standard for the
HOPKINS
MAG.,
Study
of
Public
Education,
JOHNS
https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2016/winter/coleman-report-public-education/
[https://perma.cc/3QHA-ETTB] (last accessed Jan. 1, 2019); see also James S.
Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUC.,
AND
WELFARE:
OFF.
OF
EDUC.
(1966),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED012275.pdf (last accessed Mar. 21, 2019).
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renamed the Secretary of Education after the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare became a cabinet level post in
1979—to study public education and determine how much “race,
color, religion, or national origin” affected equality of education in
public schools. 173 President Lyndon Johnson eventually reached
out to Sociologist James Coleman, who agreed to conduct the
study. 174 His findings were published in a 1966 report titled
“Equality of Educational Opportunity.” 175
Coleman’s findings were nuanced and not susceptible to
political categorization. First, Coleman discerned what is now
known as the achievement gap. 176 Poor and African-American
students scored several grades below affluent white students in
math and reading. 177 However, the cause was not, as liberal
reformers had surmised, a simple lack of money. Coleman found
that the most important factor dictating a child’s success was his or
her familial and social circumstances.178 As Coleman later
explained, “‘[a]ll factors considered, the most important variable—
in or out of school—in a child’s performance remains his family’s
education background.’” 179
Coleman’s other findings further explained the achievement
gap. Coleman found that diversity, in the fullest sense of the word,
was crucial to student success.180 This meant a holistic sense of
diversity beyond mere racial diversity. 181 Coleman also observed
that affluent students succeeded because they felt they had agency
and were masters of their own fate. 182 The poor, by contrast, felt
that they were victims of life circumstances. 183 Coleman also
discounted the role of teachers, finding that learning was a
“‘function more of the characteristics of his classmates than of those

173. Evitts Dickinson, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Coleman, supra note 172, at 29 (“Thus, there is more to “school
integration” than merely putting Negroes and whites in the same building, and
there may be more important consequences of integration than its effect on
achievement.”).
182. Evitts Dickinson, supra note 172.
183. Id.
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of the teacher.’” 184
With specific respect to school funding, Coleman found that
while there were “some definite and systematic directions of
difference between the schools attended by minorities and those
attended by the majority,” there was relatively little disparity
between the facilities and programs afforded to African-American
and white communities. 185
Regional factors were “usually
considerably greater than minority-majority differences.” 186
Coleman specifically found that “when student body characteristics
[we]re taken into account, the variance accounted for by a facilities
measure (which includes per pupil expenditure) is very small
indeed.” 187 Coleman further submitted that “if adjustments had
been made to remove student body factors in the present analysis,
together with facilities and curriculum measures, the unique
contribution of per pupil expenditure for Southern Negroes would
have nearly vanished.” 188 Thus, according to the report, there was
not a drastic need to redistribute cash to African-American and
poor communities. 189 However, even if policymakers were inclined
to do so, Coleman felt that those efforts would be in vain.190 As he
put it, schools “‘bring little influence to bear on a child’s
achievement that is independent of his background and social
context.’” 191 Poor school achievement, in other words, was a mere
symptom of an unhealthy social and familial environment. 192
The report was not what the public or the federal government
expected.193 It did not suggest simple or identifiably partisan
recommendations, and liberals and conservatives derived different
lessons from it. 194 Liberals focused on the economic inequality
findings, arguing that economic redistribution would help fight
poverty and inequality. 195 Conservatives argued that more money
would not solve schools’ woes since, according to the report, money
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Coleman, supra note 172, at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 312.
Id.
See Evitts Dickinson, supra note 172.
HARTMAN, supra note 153, at 215.
Id.
See Evitts Dickinson, supra note 172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was a relatively irrelevant factor in student achievement.196
The liberal interpretation inspired many in the academy to
launch an offensive against school financing systems. 197 Almost
every state, including Rhode Island, divided public education costs
at the state and local levels, relying on a formula to determine the
extent of the state contribution. While the state contribution was
equal or equitable (i.e., it provided a greater percentage of money
to poorer districts), this was usually offset by large disparities in
local contributions, which were culled from local school taxes
(which, in turn, were derived from the property tax base).
This discrepancy was untenable to many reformers, including
scholars. 198 Historian James Gordon Ward has traced the origin of
the argument that discrepancies in school funding violated the U.S.
Constitution’s Equal Protection clause to two books. 199 Educator
Arthur Wise published the first, Rich Schools Poor Schools, in
1968.200 In the book, Wise applied Brown I’s equal protection
principle to school funding. 201 If “separate but equal” school
systems were unconstitutional, Wise asked, how could unequally
funded school systems be constitutional? 202 Wise offered a detailed
journey through a wide array of Supreme Court cases concerning
the equal protection clause. 203 After concluding that the Supreme
Court had, in many instances, intervened to protect groups which
had been subject to irrational treatment, Wise posed the following
inquiry: “Can children receive substantially different educational
opportunities solely because of their parents’ economy

196. Id.
197. James Gordon Ward, Conflict and Consensus in the Historical Process:
The Intellectual Foundations of the School Finance Reform Litigation
Movement, 24 J. OF EDUC. FIN., no. 1, Summer 1998, at 14.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 14–15. Professor Judith C. Areen notes that Arthur Wise posed
a short version of the argument in a 1965 article in the publication
Administrator’s Notebook. See Judith C. Areen, The Judicial and Education
Reform: A Reassessment, 61 GEO. L. REV. 1009, 1012, n.19 (1973). Wise
explained, in a published interview, that the 1965 article was based upon a
term paper which he wrote while a student at Harvard in the spring of 1964.
Deborah A. Verstegen, Arthur E. Wise and the Promise of Equal Educational
Opportunity, 25 J. OF EDUC. FIN., no. 4, Spring 2000, at 583, 585.
200. Gordon Ward, supra note 197, at 14.
201. Id.
202. See generally ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR SCHOOLS: THE
PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968).
203. Id.
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circumstances or where they happen to be born?” 204 Wise laid out
two approaches the Supreme Court could take to address this issue
of educational equality. 205 The Court could, as did the Warren
Court in cases concerning criminal and indigent rights, proceed on
a case-by-case basis. 206 Alternatively, the Court could dive in to a
state’s finances and “deal with disparities in pupil expenditures” by
declaring certain disparities to be unconstitutional. 207 Wise opined
that the Court would not have to seek complete equality because
there were circumstances, such as gifted students, students with
disabilities, and “regional price differences,” that justified disparate
expenditures.208
Toward the end of the book, Wise candidly admitted that the
“political impasse” of educational financing was “the basic reason
for considering the problem a constitutional one.”209 Put bluntly,
state legislators had no incentive to spend money that did not
provide “direct benefits” to their constituents. 210 In other words, as
in Brown, the political route was a dead-end, and the only hope for
reform would be through the judiciary. This reflected the prevalent
view in the 1960s that the Supreme Court could and should be used
as a tool to effectuate social policy. 211
The second seminal book in shaping school funding litigation
was John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and Stephen D.
Sugarman’s Private Wealth and Public Education, published in

204. Id. at 158–59.
205. Id. at 192–93.
206. Id. at 193.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 194.
209. Id. at 198.
210. Id.
211. See William B. Gould, Rich Schools Poor Schools the Promise of Equal
Educational Opportunity; Quality of Inequality Urban and Suburban Public
Schools, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 145, 145–51 (1969) (book review). Professor
William B. Gould offered a trenchant analysis of Wise’s theory and its
implications in a 1969 book review. See id. Gould identified weaknesses in the
argument, including the question of whether more money would produce better
educational outcomes, and the thorny issue of remedy. Id. On the latter point,
Gould speculated that the difficulty of the issue led Wise to advocate for “rough
dollar equity.” Id. at 150. But this, argued Gould, was silly because rich whites
would not stand for it. Id. The only effective remedy would be a “complete
reversal” of spending policies, which Gould did not see as feasible. Id. Gould
concluded that the time was not right for a constitutional assault of school
finance systems. Id. at 150–51.
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1970.212 The three authors, attorneys, compiled a dense tome,
which examined issues affecting school finance and also outlined
their case against public school funding. 213 While the authors
agreed that unequal funding of schools was wrong, they recognized
that the problem eschewed a simplistic solution. 214 Indeed, the
authors recognized that local control was an essential component of
school district governance, including the ability to make local
decisions on how to allocate limited governmental resources. 215
Thus, radical yet simplistic proposals—such as abolition of the
public schools, or state control with an attendant per-pupil rate or
needs-based system—would not do. 216 The authors offered a
moderate proposal to combat the problem: a formula that rewarded
districts for the percentage of wealth they taxed instead of the
amount of tax revenue which they collected.217 The problem, the
authors posited, was that the same percentage of taxation yielded
less money in school districts with a smaller tax base.218 Thus, if
district A has ten times the tax base of district B, a ten percent tax
might yield ten million dollars in district A but only one million
dollars in district B.219 The authors proposed that the richest
district would set the tax ceiling, and the state would kick in the
amount to help poorer districts meet this ceiling.220 So using the
hypothetical above, a state would pay nine million dollars to district
B so that each district taxed ten percent of its tax base and received
ten million dollars in revenue. The authors deemed this procedure
“power equalization.” 221
The authors, unlike more utopian reformers, were not after a
fixed measure of equality or a uniform per-pupil rate. 222 They
conceded that their proposal would permit voters to let their schools
descend into financial oblivion if that was what they chose. 223 The
authors’ grievance was that school districts were not allowed a free
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

JOHN E. COONS, ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 14–16.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34–35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 17–35.
Id. at 35.
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or fair choice with respect to funding, as the deck was stacked in
favor of districts with more taxable wealth. 224 Thus, the authors’
argument can be described as “free market plus”: it heartily
endorsed a libertarian approach to school district funding so long
as the playing field was leveled.
Interestingly, Private Wealth and Public Education opened
with a foreword by none other than James Coleman, author of
Equality of Educational Opportunity.225 Coleman’s foreword was
laudatory but guarded. 226 Coleman credited the scope of the
authors’ inquiry and their novel theory of power equalization; he
deemed it “an impressive intellectual feat.” 227 Coleman also voiced
his agreement with those portions of the book advocating for family
choice, reiterating his findings that a child’s familial and social
circumstances were of paramount importance.228 Thus, “any state
which dictates the school or school district to which each child goes
is unequally distributing . . . educational resources, however
equally it is distributing finances.” 229
Coleman concluded his foreword by asking the big question
that loomed behind Private Wealth and Public Education: “How far
should states go in seeking equality?” 230 The answer, Coleman
stated, was elusive.231 Tinkering with funding mechanisms was
relatively uncontroversial. 232 But there had also been, as Coleman
delicately observed, state efforts toward “racial and class
integration,” which proved “even more ineffective than . . .
attempt[s] to redistribute financial resources.” 233 Thus, the role of
the states was “not a question that is easily answered, and it is not
a question raised in this book.” 234 Those difficult questions would
soon be raised in a series of court cases alleging that local funding
mechanisms violated the United States Constitution.
VI. SCHOOL FUNDING LITIGATION: FROM THE ACADEMY TO THE
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at xix.
Id. at vii–xvi.
Id.
Id. at x.
Id. at xiv.
Id.
Id. at xvi.
Id.
Id. at xv.
Id.
Id. at xvi.
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COURTROOM

Wise and the trio of Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, represented
a “wave of consciously activist scholarship written with an avowed
bias, and aimed at producing specific legal results.” 235
Unsurprisingly, activists transported these arguments into
court. 236 While the precise legal theory varied, the basic premise,
was that states were not evenly or fairly distributing resources
among districts. 237 The first landmark victory for advocates was
Serrano v. Priest, a 1971 decision by the California Supreme Court,
which held that California’s school funding system violated the
equal protection clause. 238 California, like most states, funded
schools through a combination of local property taxes and state
funds.239 The California Supreme Court reasoned, using language
reminiscent of Coons et al., that the system was unconstitutional
because it “makes the quality of a child’s education depend upon
the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the
pocketbook of his parents.” 240 While the court agreed with the
plaintiffs on the equal protection argument, it expressly disclaimed
reliance on the education guarantee in the California Constitution,
ruling that the state constitutional guarantee of a “system” of public
education merely referred to “uniform[ity] in terms of the
prescribed course of study and educational progression from grade
to grade,” not equal funding. 241 Due to the procedural posture of
the case, the court did not have to address the thorny issue of
remedy; the case was instead remanded for trial.242
235. Stephen R. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A
Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504,
512 (1972).
236. Id.
237. The first significant challenge in the postwar era was McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff’d per curiam sub nom. McInnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 1197 (1969). The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment claim and, additionally, dismissed the matter as
presenting a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 337. The Supreme Court
denied review in a per curiam decision. McInnis, 394 U.S. 1197.
238. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
239. Id. at 1246.
240. Id. at 1263.
241. Id. at 1249.
242. On remand, the trial court found, unsurprisingly, that the system was
unconstitutional. However, before the trial court issued its decision, the
United States Supreme Court decided San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, discussed below, which seriously undercut the California
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Serrano’s radical holding delighted advocates and stunned
more circumspect commentators. 243 Professor Judith C. Areen
found it “remarkable” that a court would “simply assume [] that
quantity of funding relates directly to quality of schooling,” relying
upon “a simple factory model” where “money was the input and
educated students the output.” 244 Serrano also inspired similar
lawsuits throughout the country, including a federal lawsuit filed
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
captioned Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District. 245
The court’s decision could have been written by Coons and his coauthors; for example, in a knowingly or unknowingly plagiarized
passage, the court wrote that “the quality of public education may
not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a
whole.246 The defendants, state entities, appealed the decision and

Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Additionally,
the California Legislature attempted to address the disparities, which efforts
the California Supreme Court criticized in its 1971 opinion. Serrano, 487 P.2d
1241. In 1976, the California Supreme Court again held, that California’s
school funding system was unconstitutional, basing its holding on the equal
protection clause of the State constitution. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
938–39 (Cal. 1976). The court upheld the trial court’s findings, including a
finding that “differences in dollars do produce differences in pupil
achievement.” Id. at 930. The court also noted multiple remedies which the
Legislature could adopt:
(1) full state funding, with the imposition of a statewide property tax;
(2) consolidation of the present 1,067 school districts into about five
hundred districts, with boundary realignments to equalize assessed
valuations of real property among all school districts; (3) retention of
the present school district boundaries but the removal of commercial
and industrial property from local taxation for school purposes and
taxation of such property at the state level; (4) school district power
equalizing[,] which has as its essential ingredient the concept that
school districts could choose to spend at different levels but for each
level of expenditure chosen the tax effort would be the same for each
school district choosing such level whether it be a high-wealth or a
low-wealth district; (5) vouchers; and (6) some combination of two or
more of the above.
Id. at 938–39.
243. Areen, supra note 199, at 1013.
244. Id.
245. 337 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Paul
D. Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1231–32, n.31 (1973).
246. Compare Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280, rev’d, 411 U.S. 1, with COONS
ET AL., supra note 212, at 2 (“The quality of public education may not by a
function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.”).
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the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 247
As explained in Rodriguez, Texas, like California, Rhode
Island, and virtually all states, operated a dual system of school
financing comprised of local property taxes and state funding. 248 In
the mid-twentieth-century, Texas—again, like Rhode Island—
established a foundation aid program designed to distribute state
aid to those districts that needed it most.249 However, inequalities
among districts persisted, largely due to differing property tax
bases. 250 The Rodriguez lawsuit was brought as a class action
lawsuit by Mexican-American students and other minority
students “who [were] poor and reside[d] in school districts having a
low property tax base . . . .” 251
Finding that wealth was a ‘suspect’ classification and that
education was a ‘fundamental’ interest, the district court held that
the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show
that it was premised upon some compelling state interest. 252 On
that issue, the court concluded, “[n]ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate a compelling state interest . . . they fail even to
establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.” 253
The United States Supreme Court reversed, in a rebuke to the
district court and Serrano. 254 The Court first addressed the
plaintiffs’ imprecise definition of its “suspect class.” 255 The Court
found the district court’s analysis on this point to be lackadaisical,
surmising that the class could be defined one of three ways: (1)
“poor” people as defined by a certain level of income; (2) relatively
poor individuals; or (3) those who live in “poor” school districts. 256
The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient
evidence on the first two categories.257 It further noted that, proof
aside, the assumption underlying these class definitions (i.e., that
the poorest people lived in locations with the worst public schools)
247. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
248. Id. at 6.
249. Id. at 6–10.
250. Id. at 8.
251. Id. at 5.
252. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282–84
(W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
253. Id. at 284.
254. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
255. Id. at 19.
256. Id. at 19–20.
257. Id. at 22.
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was not self-evident.258 With respect to the third definition, the
Court noted that this could be defined to include children in every
district other than the richest district (the definition adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Serrano), or children in districts with
assessable property that falls below some fixed measure. 259 The
Court did not accept either of these definitions, deeming the
plaintiffs “a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the
common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less
taxable wealth than other districts.” 260
Next, the Court held that education was not a fundamental
right under the United States Constitution.261 Education was not
found in the text of the Constitution, the Court reasoned, and the
mere importance of a right did not make it fundamental. 262 In a
bit of circular reasoning, the Court stated that a right could only be
considered fundamental if it were an “established constitutional
right.” 263
Linguistic formulations aside, the “established
constitutional right” standard presented a high bar. For example,
as the Rodriguez Court noted, a 1970 decision held that the right to
public welfare benefits was not fundamental. 264 Moreover, the
plaintiffs in Rodriguez were not alleging a total deprivation of
education, they merely complained about relative funding levels
and the relative quality of education.265 Thus, the Court found that
the plaintiffs failed meet their burden of proving a fundamental
258. Id. at 23.
259. Id. at 27–28.
260. Id. at 28. Criticisms of Rodriguez tend to ignore the plaintiffs’
weaknesses in defining the alleged suspect class. For example, Professor
Justin Driver, in a highly readable survey of United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning public education, states in this respect that the Rodriguez
majority merely “entertained the possibility that some indigent citizens might
in fact live in property-rich school districts and vice-versa.” JUSTIN DRIVER,
THE SCHOOL-HOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 320 (2018). Professor Driver also describes
the class definition as one of several “doctrinal niceties.” Id. at 321.
Nevertheless, while sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims, Professor Driver
acknowledges that the challenge was a product of its times, and that, were it
filed today, “it seems plausible that challengers . . . would find not a single
justice who agreed that the Constitution prohibits arrangements resembling
those contested in Rodriguez.” Id. at 326.
261. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 31.
264. Id. at 33.
265. Id. at 37.
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right.266
Because the case did not involve infringement of a fundamental
right, it received the same scrutiny as ordinary legislation: rational
basis review. Under this standard, Texas passed with flying
colors. 267 As a preliminary matter, the Court recognized that the
case “involve[d] . . . persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy” outside of the Court’s bailiwick. 268 Borrowing a memorable
phrase from Dandridge v. Williams, the welfare benefits case, the
Court stated: “Education, perhaps even more than welfare
assistance, presents a myriad of ‘intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems.’” 269 The Court further observed that
Texas had taken numerous steps to decrease inequality and
promote education throughout the state. 270
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that disparate
funding harmed poor individuals. Taxation always has some
discriminatory impact, the Court noted, and states needed some
leeway to design and carry out such systems. 271 Additionally, the
Court explained, even if it declared Texas’ system unconstitutional,
the plaintiffs did not propose an alternative system to replace it.272
Presumably, the Court noted in a footnote, the replacement would
be one hundred percent state funding.273 The Court also identified
the “power equalization” theory of Coons et al. as another
alternative, but dismissed it as unworkable, noting that
commentators disagreed as to “whether it is feasible, how it would
work, and indeed whether [the theory itself] would violate the equal
protection [clause] . . . .” 274
Thus, the door to a federal right to education had been
decisively closed, but advocates were not deterred. They promptly
shifted their focus to the states, grounding their arguments in state
equal protection clauses. 275 Indeed, in a major victory for
266. Id. at 40.
267. Id. at 53–54.
268. Id. at 42.
269. Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
270. Id. at 45–48.
271. Id. at 41.
272. Id. at 41 n.85.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Emily Parker, Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC.
COMMISSION OF THE STATES (Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NYQ5-RK94].
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advocates, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in
1973 (the same year Rodriguez was decided) that its school funding
system violated the State’s education clause.276 Over the next
several decades, dozens of lawsuits were filed alleging that
educational funding violated state constitutions.277 Eventually, as
Michael A. Rebell explained, “[a]t the end of the 1980s, civil rights
lawyers changed their focus from equal protection claims based on
disparities in . . . funding . . . to claims based on opportunities for a
basic level of education guaranteed by the specific provisions in the
state constitutions.” 278 Thus, arguments about “equality” gave way
to arguments about “adequacy.” 279 The underlying issue, however,
remained the same: litigants sought to use the courts to effectuate
social change concerning public education.280
Within the context of school funding litigation, New Jersey is
also famous for the monumental struggle of the New Jersey
Supreme Court to bend the legislature to its will. As noted above,
in a landmark 1973 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
the state’s funding mechanism unconstitutional.281 And in a later
decision, Abbott v. Burke, the court found that the educational
system was inadequate as applied to poor urban districts.282 After
Abbott, the matters returned to the political branches, where footdragging and noncompliance followed. Commentator Alexandra
Greif has described an example of the legislature’s failings: the
fallout after the passage of the State Quality Education Act of 1990
(QEA).283 The QEA would have redistributed money into the poor
urban districts at issue in pending school funding litigation. 284
However, it faced fierce resistance from suburban voters and the

276. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973).
277. An Introduction to Equality of Opportunity, STAN. U.,
https://edeq.stanford.edu/sections/equality-opportunity-introduction
[https://perma.cc/T6VR-JXYX] (last accessed Jan. 27, 2019).
278. REBELL, supra note 8, at 17.
279. David Hinojosa & Karolina Walters, How Adequacy Litigation Fails to
Fulfill the Promise of Brown [But How It Can Get Us Closer], 2014 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 575, 602 (2014).
280. See generally id.
281. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 298.
282. 575 A.2d 359, 412 (N.J. 1990).
283. Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615,
621–22 (2004).
284. Id. at 621.
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state’s largest teachers’ union. 285 Greif explains that the law
shifted pension contributions from the state to local districts, and
that teachers would get lower benefits or wages if the local districts
could not meet their pension responsibilities.286 Against this
political backlash, “legislators buckled.” 287 They replaced the QEA
with a watered-down successor, and Democrats, who held
majorities in the legislature and had championed the QEA, paid
with their seats. Even though the QEA had never taken effect and
Democrats acceded to public outcry, many voters still smoldered
over Democrats support for the QEA in the first instance. As a
result, in 1991, Republicans gained majorities in both houses. 288
The case presented a cautionary tale in school funding litigation;
not only was legislative compliance with court orders a heavy
political lift, but doing so could also cost legislators their jobs.
Given the ubiquity of state education and equal protection
clauses, it was only a matter of time until a school funding lawsuit
reached Rhode Island.
Economic circumstances provided a
convenient moment: “severe economic distress” caused by the
Governor’s closing of forty-five insolvent credit unions in 1991
resulted in caps to state education reimbursement. The overall
reimbursement rate dropped from 52.3 percent in 1991 to 38.1
percent in 1992. 289
VII. CHALLENGES TO RHODE ISLAND’S PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING
SYSTEM

The first challenge to Rhode Island’s funding system was City
of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, a consolidated challenge brought by
students, parents, government officials, and multiple schools.290
On February 24, 1994, the superior court ruled that Rhode Island’s
funding system violated the state equal protection and education
clauses of the Rhode Island Constitution. 291 Following this
blockbuster holding, a host of school districts and politicians

285. Greif, supra note 285, at 622.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 53 (R.I. 1995).
290. Id. The plaintiffs sued multiple state officials in their individual
capacities. Id. at 42. The superior court bifurcated the claim into liability and
damages portions. Id. at 43.
291. Id. at 42.
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scrambled to intervene on appeal.292
In its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first explained
that the General Assembly was entitled to enormous
deference.293 Rhode Island vested unlimited power in the
legislature, subject only to constitutional carve-outs for the
executive and judiciary branches.294 Thus, to prevail, the litigants
were required to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the
legislature violated the constitution.295
The court next examined the history of the education
clause.296 The court noted that, although there were consistent
calls to establish a system of free schools in Rhode Island in after
the revolution, localism generally prevailed.297 An 1828 Act
permitted towns to raise revenue to support schools and established
a state fund to support education. 298 But efforts such as this
contemplated minimal state involvement in public education. 299
This approach persisted after the Dorr Rebellion. The court
noted, as explained above, that the legislature deliberately snubbed
Dorr’s People’s Constitution with respect to education by adopting,
almost verbatim, the language utilized in the Landholders’
Constitution.300 Additionally, Barnard’s suggestions, enacted by
the legislature, squeezed local districts for funds, not the
State. 301 Indeed, the Barnard Act’s requirement that localities
impose a certain level of local taxation as a prerequisite to obtaining
state funds demonstrated that localities bore the primary
responsibility for education. 302
The plaintiffs’ expert conceded that neither the 1842
Constitution nor the Barnard Act required towns to even establish
schools, let alone ensure an equal or minimum level of funding.303
Indeed, the court observed that the legislature did not explicitly
292. Id. at 43.
293. Id. at 44–45.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 45.
296. See id. at 45–46. Throughout its decision, the Court principally relied
upon Charles A. Carroll’s “Public Education in Rhode Island.” See CARROLL,
supra note 21.
297. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45.
298. See id. at 46.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 47–48.
301. Id. at 48.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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require that towns operate schools until 1882.304 The expert
further conceded that equal funding was a “‘relatively new concept’”
unknown to nineteenth-century legislators.305
The court also determined that the Rhode Island
Constitutional Convention of 1986 did not add anything to its
analysis.306 By 1986, Rodriguez was thirteen years old and school
funding lawsuits had been litigated in at least seventeen state
courts. 307 Thus, if the 1986 convention sought to provide a
minimum funding level or impose some sort of equality principle, it
would have explicitly done so, and it did not. Indeed, among the
resolutions that it explicitly rejected were guarantees of “‘an equal
opportunity for an education on a per capita basis,’” and “‘an equal
education regardless of [a child’s] community of residence.’”308
The court then considered the parties’ equal protection claim.
In an analysis echoing Rodriguez, the court explained that the
General Assembly had, since the mid-twentieth century, increased
state funding for public education and attempted to make it more
equitable. 309 At the turn of the century, the State offered funding
to school districts that enacted desired reforms,310 such as creating
high schools or hiring qualified superintendents.311 In 1955, Rhode
Island enacted its foundation aid program, which provided a per
pupil rate of seventeen dollars and a $200,000 equalization fund to
be distributed based on need.312 In 1960, that program was
supplanted by an operation aid program, which ensured that the
State shouldered a greater percentage of the cost of education in
poorer districts. 313 Rhode Island further enacted a host of reforms
in the early 1990s that further increased the amount of aid to poorer
districts. 314 The court stated that the wealthy districts currently
receive little, if any, State reimbursement. 315 And in 1993, the
legislature created a “distressed district fund,” which provided
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
See id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51–52.
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money—for public school purposes only—to three poor districts.316
In sum, as local and State school spending consistently increased,
the State had taken measures to redistribute funding where it was
needed. 317
In reaching a contrary holding, the superior court had reasoned
that Rhode Island’s education clause was textually similar to
clauses in Massachusetts and Kentucky, whose courts found their
state funding schemes unconstitutional. 318 The superior court also
reasoned that the word “promote” in the education clause imposed
an obligation on the State to ensure that school districts were
roughly equal because “in many instances” in the nineteenth
century, the word was used interchangeably with “found” or
“establish.” 319
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected these arguments.320
First, any suggestion that the history of the education clause
supported an official measure of adequacy or equality was “clearly
wrong.” 321 Rhode Island towns were not required to have schools in
1842.322 If there was no mandate for a school, there was certainly
no mandate for equity.323 Second, “promote” did not obligate the
State to offer some base level of service. 324 Quoting the definition
of “promote” in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, the court found
that the word, then and now, meant “[t]o forward” or “to
advance.” 325 And, as evidenced by the education clause, “promote”
could not mean found or establish for two reasons: first, towns were
not required to establish schools; and, second, towns established the
schools, not the general assembly. 326 Finally, the court observed
that the general assembly’s mission—to “promote education by all
means which it may deem necessary and proper”—reflected a desire
to vest educational issues in the general assembly and to afford it
discretion in choosing how to accomplish such goals. 327
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 53.
See id. at 50–54.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56–57.
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The court next addressed the separation of powers doctrine,
which applied to both the education clause and equal protection
claims. 328 The judiciary, the court reasoned, was an inappropriate
forum for school funding challenges.329 Even if the court deemed
the funding scheme unconstitutional, there were no “judicially
manageable standards” to manage the legislature’s efforts.330 The
court cited the bitter back-and-forth that occurred between the
state legislature and the judiciary in New Jersey in the wake of
Abbott. The court also cited the United States Supreme Court’s
1995 decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, which released Missouri from
an eighteen-year-old desegregation order.331 The thrust of that
decision was that the district in question had made progress toward
integration and that control over the school system should be
returned to the local district as soon as possible. 332 Heeding
Jenkins, the Sundlun court held that the General Assembly had
virtually unlimited discretion, and that the plaintiffs “should seek
their remedy in that forum rather than in the courts.” 333
Nevertheless, the court briefly touched upon the merits of the
equal protection claim. 334 The court reasoned that the level of
scrutiny was low because no fundamental right was involved.
Thus, the court easily found that preservation of local control was
a legitimate state interest and that reliance on a partial degree of
local financing for school district rationally furthered this
interest. 335 The court further chided the superior court for
excluding evidence of Rhode Island’s relative equality in education
funding. 336 This revealed that, in 1989–1990, Rhode Island was
the third most equalized per-pupil ratio state in the country. 337 The
court acknowledged that Rhode Island, and most of New England,
offered a low amount of total state reimbursement. 338 But more
significantly for an equal protection analysis, the amount offered
was equitably distributed.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)).
Id.
Id. at 57, 63.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id.
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Finally, the court noted that it was loath to endorse a definition
of equality that was outcome-based. Citing again to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, it noted that the school
district in that case received significant financial upgrades after the
desegregation decree, yet continued to struggle with
achievement. 339 This “illustrate[d] that money alone may never be
sufficient to bring about ‘learner outcomes’ in all students.”340
Decisive as Sundlun was, two school committees, Woonsocket
and Pawtucket, posed a second challenge in 2010. 341 According to
the complaint, two things had changed since Sundlun, which
compelled an opposite result. First, Rhode Island voters adopted
constitutional amendments in 2004, which affirmed the principle of
separation of powers and eliminated the “Continuing Powers”
clause discussed in Sundlun. 342 This clause stated that the general
assembly continued to possess the powers it wielded prior to the
1842 Constitution. 343 Second, the general assembly had tweaked
the school funding formula and, according to the plaintiffs,
produced new disparities. 344 The school committees again asserted
violations of the state equal protection clause and added an
allegation that the funding scheme violated students’ substantive
due process rights. 345
The superior court rejected the claims out of hand, reasoning
that Sundlun and an advisory opinion issued by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in 2008 precluded such challenges under the
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778 (R.I. 2014).
342. Id. at 789–90.
343. The clause read: “‘The general assembly shall continue to exercise the
powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution.’” Id.
344. One of the School Committee’s lawyers laid out the litigation strategy
in an article published less than a year before the filing of the complaint.
Samuel D. Zurier, Esq., Separation of Powers and Rhode Island’s
Constitutional Right to A Public Education, 57 R.I. B.J. 7, 7 (May/June 2009).
The second attorney representing the School Committees apparently changed
his mind as to the validity of another state court challenge; he co-authored an
article five years after Sundlun in which he theorized that the Rhode Island
State Courts were closed to school adequacy claims and that the most viable
theory, though an uphill battle, would be alleged violations of the Federal
Equal Protection Clause and Article VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in federal
court. David V. Abbott & Stephen M. Robinson, School Finance Litigation: The
Viability of Bringing Suit in the Rhode Island Federal District Court, 5 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 441, 444 (2000).
345. Chafee, 89 A.3d at 782.
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doctrine of stare decisis.346 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court agreed, finding that the issues had been squarely raised and
addressed in Sundlun.347 The court acknowledged that Sundlun
had cited and relied upon the “Continuing Powers” clause, but the
court found that its reasoning was not dependent upon the
clause.348 The Sundlun court’s broader point was that, in Rhode
Island’s constitutional system of government, the general assembly
wielded plenary power over education. 349 The court made short
work of the substantive due process argument, upholding the trial
court’s finding that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
proving that the funding scheme bore “‘no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.’” 350 In sum,
while concerned by the allegations of inadequacy, and leaving the
door open for a constitutional violation on more egregious facts, the
plaintiffs had shown no reason to depart from the court’s ruling in
Sundlun.351
As noted above, litigants have commenced a new federal
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island
which, though not a typical school funding lawsuit, is a direct
descendant of the school funding litigation.352 Indeed, like many of
the school funding lawsuits, although the lawsuit is directed at the
State of Rhode Island, it has little to do with the Ocean State. 353
As noted in a recent profile of the case published in The Atlantic,
“[one] thing that made Rhode Island appealing was not that it stood
out for any reason, but that it didn’t . . . .” 354 Thus, Rhode Island
346. Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, No. 2010-946, 2012 WL 2946774,
at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 12, 2012), aff’d, 89 A.3d 778 (R.I. 2014). In the
advisory opinion, the court indicated in the advisory opinion that “‘the
separation of powers amendments did not . . . limit or abolish the power of the
General Assembly in any other area where we have previously found its
jurisdiction to be plenary.[]’” Chafee, 89 A.3d at 791 (alterations in original)
(quoting In re Request for Advisory Op. from H.R. (Coastal Res. Mgmt.
Council), 961 A.2d 930, 934 (R.I. 2008)).
347. Chafee, 89 A.3d at 789.
348. Id. at 791.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 794 (citation omitted).
351. Id. at 794–95.
352. See Complaint, supra note 1.
353. See id.
354. Alia Wong, The Students Suing for a Constitutional Right to
Education, ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2018/11/lawsuit-constitutional-right-education/576901/
[https://perma.cc/9QG5-X2LM].
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simply proved a convenient forum for a new spin on a well-worn
legal theory.355
While A.C. v. Raimondo may yet be resolved through a close
analysis of the history of the federal or Rhode Island constitutions,
early signs are not encouraging. For example, in paragraph thirtyfour of the complaint, the plaintiffs assert that “[i]n the nineteenth
century, a ‘common school’ system—i.e., the American public school
system—was established precisely to ensure that all students, rich
or poor, native or immigrant, may be educated together in a
common environment in which civic knowledge and civic values
could be inculcated.” 356 Even allowing for some advocacy, the claim
is patently untrue. The plaintiffs’ claim is reminiscent of an 1870
Thomas Nast cartoon depicting a “happy circle of racially diverse
children” as emblematic of the common schools.357 As Benjamin
Justice indicates, “Revisionist scholars and their successors have
ungently dissected the naiveté of this vision, pointing to segregated
schools for African and Native Americans, no school for Chinese
children in California, and so on.” 358
CONCLUSION

The school funding cases raise fundamental questions about
government and democracy. What role should states have in
determining school funding? Should state legislatures or courts
make these decisions? Can the democratic process be trusted to
resolve social inequality, or should the judiciary nudge the political
branches toward social progress? The answers to these questions
inevitably involve questions of constitutional interpretation, as
each state constitution mandates a system of public education. 359
355. Professor Justin Driver characterized the claim as “a creative, shrewd
effort to cobble together a coalition of liberals and conservatives.” Id.
356. See Complaint, supra note 1.
357. Benjamin Justice, Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870s,
45 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 171, 190 (2005). Michael Rebell, the lead attorney on the
case, made a similar claim in a 2009 book. REBELL, supra note 8, at 18.
Specifically, Rebell stated that most State constitutional provisions regarding
education “were incorporated into the state constitutions as part of the
common school movement of the mid-nineteenth century, which created
statewide systems for public education and attempt to inculcate democratic
values by bringing together under one roof students from all classes and
backgrounds.” Id.
358. Id.
359. See Parker, supra note 277.
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Constitutional meaning, of course, may simply be whatever a court
wants it to be. But this approach lacks principle; it turns
constitutional debates into mere political battles.
The better approach, I argue, is constitutional interpretation
based on the historical circumstances that motivated a
constitutional provision. The Rhode Island Supreme Court used
this approach in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, basing its decision
on the historical circumstances that motivated the education clause
of the Rhode Island Constitution, not a theory developed by
academics in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education. The
historical approach is “conservative” in the sense that it seeks to
constrain the potential universe of constitutional interpretation.
But this should not be conflated with political conservatism. As the
authors of a 1972 article published in the Yale Law Journal posited,
courts’ poor institutional capacity for making policy could, in the
realm of education finance, “leave the legislatures latitude to revise
educational finance in ways which would not help—and in fact
could hurt—the poor.” 360 The call of the times can be deafening.
But it is fidelity to democratic principles, such as sound
constitutional interpretation, that will ultimately prove enduring.

360. Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1304 (1972).

